

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00

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O R 231444Z FEB 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2223

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1205

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NAC CONSULTATION

FEBRUARY 27, 1974 SALT TWO--378

FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT PREPARED FOR NAC CONSULTATION, SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 27. IN ORDER TO PERMIT USNATO TO PREPARE STATEMENT FOR DISTRIBUTION AT NAC IN TIMELY MANNER, REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS OR CONCURRENCE BE CABLED TO BE RECEIVED BY USMISSION NATO BY COB FEBRUARY 26, WITH INFO COPY TO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA.

### NAC STATEMENT

I AM PLEASED TO MEET AGAIN TODAY WITH THE COUNCIL TO CONTINUE THESE CONSULTATIONS ON SALT. AS YOU KNOW, I CONSIDER THESE DISCUSSIONS TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, AND I VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE COUNCIL ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. I AM ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE THAT FOLLOWING THIS MORNING'S MEETING THERE WILL BE AN EXPERTS' SESSION FOR SUCH ADDITIONAL DETAILED DISCUSSION AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVES MAY DESIRE. REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES AT THAT SESSION WILL BE MR. RALPH EARLE, A MEMBER OF THE US SALT DELEGATION AND A FORMER MEMBER OF THE US MISSION HERE AT NATO.

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SINCE THE SALT TWO NEGOTIATIONS RECESSED ON NOVEMBER 16, 1973, THE US GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF BOTH SIDES' APPROACH TO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS REVIEW HAS CONFIRMED OUR CONVICTION THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST PROVIDE FOR A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS--ICBM'S, SLMB'S AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

AS A RESULT, THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT IT CONSIDERS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO BE A PRIMARY ELEMENT NECESSARY FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF BOTH THE REALITY AND APPEARANCE OF SUCH EQUIVALENCE. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AN INITIAL AGGREGATE CEILING FOR BOTH SIDES OF 2350, A LEVEL TO WHICH EACH SIDE CAN ADJUST WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS.

IF, HOWEVER, THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES OF ONE SIDE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY THAN THOSE OF THE OTHER, THEN EVEN THOUGH THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS MAY BE EQUAL, THERE MAY NOT BE SATISFACTORY EQUIVALENCE. THUS, THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO TAKE THE POSITION THAT A SECOND PRIMARY ELEMENT NECESSARY FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT LIMITS ON THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES.

THE UNITED STATES ALSO IS CONVINCED THAT EQUALITY CAN BE PRESERVED AND STABILITY ENHANCED AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN THAT OF THE INITIALLY AGREED AGGREGATE. ULTIMATELY LOWER LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN A STATED GOAL OF SALT, SINCE ITS INCEPTION, AND THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, PHASED OVER AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, CONSISTENT WITH EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LIMITS.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE SALT "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS." SIGNED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN WASHINGTON DURING THE JUNE 1973 SUMMIT, STATED THAT THE LIMITATIONS TO BE PLACED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS COULD APPLY BOTH TO THEIR QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS AS WELL AS THEIR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT. THESE PRINCIPLES ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT THE PROCESS OF FUTURE MODERNIZATION OF THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE

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CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONDITIONS TO BE FORMULATED IN THE AGREEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED.

THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, A KEY ELEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES APPROACH HAS BEEN TO PRESERVE THE SURVIVABILITY OF DETERRENT FORCES, AND THEREBY ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR. IN KEEPING WITH THIS DESIRE TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY,

YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN MAY OF LAST YEAR I PROPOSED A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT FREEZING THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ICBM MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS (MIRV/MRV'S). AS I REPORTED TO YOU SUBSEQUENTLY, WE HAD VIRTUALLY NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FROM EARLY MAY UNTIL THE SOVIETS FORMALLY REJECTED IT DURING THE LAST SESSION. IN THE INTERIM, THE SOVIETS UNDERTOOK A BROAD AND VIGOROUS MISSILE FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM DIRECTED TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIRV'S AND THE MODERNIZATION OF ITS ICBM FORCE. I DISCUSSED THAT PROGRAM IN SOME DETAIL AT OUR SEPTEMBER 21 CONSULTATION, AND MR. EARLE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THAT TIME WITH YOU IN THE EXPERTS' SESSION.

IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, I BELIEVE YOU WILL NOT BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT I INTEND DURING THIS SESSION TO REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING CERTAIN QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR. IN PARTICULAR, I WILL STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED REENTRY VEHICLES ON ICBM'S. IN THIS CONTEXT I WILL PROPOSE THAT PRIORITY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN IN SALT TO THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF MIRV-ED ICBM'S.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1205

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UNDER THIS CONCEPT, EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO

ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT FOR ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES. WITHIN THE EQUAL AGGREGATE CEILING ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S, EACH SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPLOY A NUMBER OF MIRV-ED ICBM'S, THE AGGREGATE TOTAL THROW-WEIGHT OF WHICH WOULD NOT EXCEED THE AGREED LEVEL.

I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT SINCE THROW-WEIGHT DETERMINES THE COMBINATIONS OF NUMBER AND WEIGHT OF REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH AN ICBM CAN CARRY, IT IS AN OBJECTIVE MEASURE OF THE USEFUL MIRV CAPABILITY OF MISSILE BOOSTERS AND, THEREFORE, OF THEIR DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL. THUS, EQUALITY IN THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED REENTRY SYSTEMS WOULD INSURE EQUALITY IN THE CAPABILITY OF THIS IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING COMPONENT OF EACH SIDE'S STRATEGIC FORCES.

IN ELABORATING THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MIRV'S, I SHALL BE EMPHASIZING TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT ANY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. I PLAN TO

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DISCUSS AND OUTLINE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN MIRV MISSILE VERIFICATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO ELICIT SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT, HOWEVER, DISCUSSING SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS WITH THEM AT THIS TIME. IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, PLACING SOME LIMITATIONS ON ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S IS OF PRIORITY IMPORTANCE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR NEAR-TERM COUNTERFORCE POTENTIAL AND THE RESULTANT DESTABILIZING IMPACT ON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS WISH, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCEPT FOR DEALING WITH SLBM'S AND THEIR MIRV'S.

YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THAT THROUGHOUT MY PRESENTATION, EXCEPT FOR THE NUMERICAL AGGREGATE OF 2350, I HAVE REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING ANY SPECIFIC LEVELS FOR OVERALL CENTRAL SYSTEMS THROW-WEIGHT, PHASED MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OR MIRV-ED ICBM THROW-WEIGHT. THIS WAS NEITHER AN OVERSIGHT NOR A CONSIDERED OMISSION IN MY REPORT. AT THIS POINT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS I BELIEVE IT FAR MORE IMPORTANT AND USEFUL FIRST TO ESTABLISH A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY WE CAN CONSIDER THE DETAILS OF ANY AGREEMENT. THUS, I WILL BE SETTING FORTH IN BROAD OUTLINE WHAT THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES COULD SERVE AS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH TO THE MAJOR ISSUES WHICH CONFRONT US IN SALT.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT IT IS THE U.S. INTENTION NOT TO REITERATE ITS PREVIOUS POSITIONS ON THE OTHER ASPECTS OF A

PERMANENT AGREEMENT. OUR GOAL IS TO FOCUS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MAJOR CONCEPTS WHICH I HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE AND TO SET ASIDE FOR THE PRESENT DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES, WHOSE RESOLUTION IS DEPENDENT UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON VIEW OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS. I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE COUNCIL, HOWEVER, THAT OUR POSITION ON "FBS", ON NON-TRANSFER AND ON ALLIED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES REMAINS UNCHANGED AND AS REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL IN AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 3. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD NOTE THAT, TO DATE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ADVANCED NO NEW POSITIONS BUT HAVE REITERATED STRONGLY THEIR CALL FOR INCLUSION OF "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS NUMERICAL AGGREGATE.

THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION FOR TODAY. I WILL BE  
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GLAD TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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